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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
OEBRA LYNN MARTINEAU, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. 
ELLIOT J. ANDERSON 
and MARY CHRISTINE 
ANDERSON I 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
No. 16923 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
FILING A VERDICT WHICH IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT, 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND WHICH SHOWS 
JURY CONFUSION OR MISCONDUCT. 
Respondents in their brief have made numerous assPrtions 
and speculations which are not supported by the facts of this 
case. In addition, respondents' authorities do not assist them 
in the peculiar problem which occurred in this verdict. 
Respondents admit that the Jorgenson v. Gonzales case 
cited by both parties requires a court to resubmit a verdict 
to a jury if it appears irregular on its face. Naturally, 
Appellant agrees with this characterization of the Jorgenson 
case by Respondents. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the instant case there were three irregularities 
; . 
... ~ 
appearing on the form of the first verdict which were reviewed 
solely by the trial judge and not with counsel for either party. 
First, the verdict form awarded zero general damages and 
$940 special damages. The court noted this problem and in-
structed the jury that it had to assess general damages 
when special damages were found. 
Second, however, the special damage section stated: 
"$20 annually for 47 years -- total $940." This clearly 
should have alerted the lower court that the jury misconstrued 
the nature of special damages and a further instruction or 
direction as to this problem should also have been given. 
It should be noted from the Affidavit of Mr. Wheeler, plain-
tiff's attorney, that such a request was made by him and 
rejected by the lower court. (Supplemental record.) 
Third, the total shown on the verdict form was $1,144 
whereas the total of general damages equally zero and· 
special damages equalling $940 obviously did not compute 
to this grand total. Thus, the deficiency appeared as to whether 
the missing $204 was allotted as special damages or as general 
damages. Again, the court failed to make any instruction or 
comment upon this error. 
Respondents incorrectly state the contents of the first 
verdict. Respondents say, "The jury did make an error in 
form, however. The $204 should have remained in the special 
damages category with the $940 being removed to the general 
damage section." (Respondents' brief, pp. 11-12). And again 
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Respondents state, "The verdict form shows the amounts 
awarded to each category was merely switched; the $204 
being put in the_general damages rather than the special 
damages. This would leave the $940 as a compensation for 
some future general damages.'' (Respondents' brief, p. 
12) • 
An examination of the first verdict form clearly shows 
that Respondents' statements are in error. The original 
verdict form returned by the jury showed ~ dollars as 
general damages and $940 as special damages. The $204 
spoken of by Respondents was not listed as a general damage 
and was not listed specifically in any way. Only by sub-
tracting $940 from the total could this figure be computed. 
However, it is just as likely that the $204 figure was intended 
as special damages but at that it had not been specifically 
listed with the $940. 
In this instance, therefore, the jury could just as easily 
have intended to award $1,144 in special damages and zero 
dollars in general damages. In such a case an obvious error 
occurs since there are no general damages awarded and all damages 
are listed as special damages. This verdict is clearly insuffi-
cient under Utah law. 
The second alternative is to assume that the $204 was 
meant by the jury to be general damages. Under this theory, 
the jury corrected the second verdict form to reflect their 
intention. They therefore listed $204 as general damages and 
$9.40 as special damages with the explanation that this money 
-3-
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was $20 annualiy for 47 years. Since the jury obviously 
was confused as to this $940 it should have been properly 
placed in the general damage section. In this instance, 
then, the $1144 would have been general damages with no 
award being made for special damages. Because Plaintiff 
produced uncontroverted medical testimony as to the expenses 
she incurred as a result of the accident, the failure to 
award any special damages would also have been insufficient 
under Utah law. 
~s in the Brown case cited by Respondents (Respondents' 
brief, p. 10), the jury was obviously confused or did not 
understand the difference between the terms ''general damages" 
and "special damages." While in Brown, the jury was able to 
correct this misunderstanding after being informed by the 
trial court as to the eLror, in the instant case the jury was 
still confused and still misunderstood its obligation to 
separate the damages as is evidenced by the second jury 
verdict form. 
This is not a case similar to those cited by Respondents 
from the Supreme Court of Oregon. (Respondents' brief, pp. 
14-15; 17-19). In both the Moore and Locatelli cases, it was 
impossible for the court to ascertain whether the damages had 
been correctly characterized by the jury since only the figures 
themselves were listed in the verdict forms. Appellant does 
not dispute the proposition that when special damages are 
susceptible to conflicting evidence and where general damages 
are also subject to conflicts that the jury is free to arrive 
-4-
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at any figure it desires to compensate the plaintiff. 
See also Weeks v. Calderwood, (Utah, January 25, 1979, 
No. 15671). 
In this case, however, there is no question that the 
jury misconstrued special damages with general damages, 
as evidenced by the notation concerning the 47 years annuity. 
Had the amounts themselves been inserted at $204 and $940 
it would have been only speculative for this Court or the parties 
to ascertain how the amounts were arrived at on the verdict form. 
But when the comments of the jury obviously show a direct 
misconception of the court's instructions the verdict is on 
its face insufficient and requires correction. Jorgenson, supra. 
In summary, therefore, it is appellant's contention that 
the three errors made on the face of the first verdict form 
and the one error made on the face of the second verdict form 
showed that the jury did not understand the general - special 
damage distinction and that it is only speculation on the 
part of Respondents and Appellant as to what the jury believed 
or disbelieved in the evidence. 
To say that the jury would have reached the same result 
had it understood the distinction in damages is as speculative 
and unsupported as for Appellant to say that the jury would 
have reached a different result had it understood the court's 
instructions. Since it cannot be said that this confusion 
would have resulted in the same verdict and would be harmless 
error, a new trial must be ordered by this Court to correct 
this extremely prejudicial error. Brunson v. Strong, 412 P.2d 
451 (Utah 1966). 
-5-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO·GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
EXAMINE THE VERDICT FORMS BEFORE THEY 
WERE RESUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND BEFORE 
THE JURY WAS DISMISSED AND PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL DID NOT WAIVE ANY DEFECT IN THE 
FORM OF THE VERDICT. 
Respondents assert that Plaintiff's counsel waived any 
defect in the jury form by not objecting to it at the time it 
was delivered. As noted in Appellant's brief, in chief, there 
is no doubt that an attorney for a client can waive an irregularit 
in the verdict form if a proper objection is not timely made. 
However, the facts in the instant case and those in the Langton 
and Cohn cases are decidedly different. 
In the instant case the record shows that when the verdict 
was returned the trial court examined it, determined it was 
insufficient, and called counsel to a side-bar conference. 
(~r. 236-237). As is typical in Utah courts, the conference was 
not reported. It is undisputed, however, that the trial court 
did not offer to show the verdict to either counsel. The jury 
was then told that special damages could not be awarded in the 
absence of general damages and told to deliberate once again. 
(~r. 237). Mr. Wheeler's suggestion for a further instruction 
on special and general damages was rejected by the court. 
fSupplernental record) • 
Five minutes later the new verdict was returned and the 
court stated that the verdict could be published. The record 
shows that " the verdict was published by the clerk and the 
jury was Polled." {Tr. 238). Plaintiff contends that at 
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the time the clerk read the jury verdict the language referring 
to the annuity was omitted. The court then received the 
verdict and ordered it filed. It then excused the jury and 
it was not until this point that the actual form was shown 
to Plaintiff's counsel. 
Thus, since Respondents do not dispute the manner of reading 
the verdict by the clerk it can be assumed for purposes of this 
appeal that the verdict form was read without the annuity lan-
guage contained in the special damage section. Without hearing 
this language Plaintiff's counsel had no way of knowing that 
the jury had incorrectly placed an item of general damages in 
the special damage section, thereby making the verdict erroneous 
on its face and erroneous for failing to find any special 
damages. 
In both Langton and Cohn there was no question raised that 
the attorney representing the plaintiff was aware of the 
exact language contained in the verdict form. In both not only 
did plaintiffs' counsel receive the verdict form before the 
jury was dismissed but the trial court specifically asked 
plaintiffs' counsel if there was anything further counsel 
wished to bring before the court. 
In the instant case, however, Plaintiff's counsel properly 
assumed that the verdict form as read by the clerk contained 
all of the information written by the jury. When the clerk 
failed to read the critical language concerning the annuity 
it can hardly be said that Plaintiff's counsel waived an 
opportunity to object to the form of the verdict. 
Since a heavy burden is placed upon counsel at the time 
-7-
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a verdict is returned and since a waiver can easily be 
assessed again~t the counsel's client, it is Appellant's 
position that this Court should formulate a rule in the 
state of Utah making it mandatory for the trial court to 
allow both counsel to examine the verdict form before it is 
read by the clerk and entered by the court. 
Such a rule would allow counsel to bring to the court's 
attention any error in the verdict form before the verdict is 
entered and would clearly establish that counsel was aware of 
the exact language contained in the form and therefore that 
any irregularity was waived. 
In the alternative, this Court should formulate a require-
ment that the court reporters of the state report the exact 
language read by the clerk when the verdict is being published 
and that the trial court, as in Cohn, specifically give counser 
an opportunity to bring matters before the court while the jury 
is still empaneled. 
It is obvious that in any type of a "waiver" situation 
it is fundamental that the party who is waiving his right 
must know of the rights which he is waiving. In the absence 
of being able to see the entire scheme of the first and second 
verdict and being able to see the comments made by the jury 
it cannot be said that Plaintiff's counsel waived any _defect 
in the form. On the other hand, the lower court which saw 
both the first and second verdict allowed the verdict to be 
published when it contained an obvious defect on its face which 
should have required resubmission to the jury and clarification 
to the jury as to general and special damages. 
-8-
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It is fun~amentally unfair to forgive a lower court 
for its errors in allowing an erroneous verdict to be 
entered and punishing the attorneys for failure to bring 
such errors to the court's attention while at the same time 
not requiring the court to give the counsel a sufficient 
opportunity to examine the verdict and make the proper objections 
before the jury is excused. 
For this reason, Appellant respectfully suggests that the 
failure to show counsel the two verdict forms at the time they 
were entered constituted error in this case and that a new rule 
should be formulated for all future cases in the state of 
Utah to prevent similar confusion and injustice. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO· GRANT 
PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL IN THAT THE JURY AWARDED 
INADEQUATE DAMAGES NOT BASED UPON THE UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL. 
Respondents again resort to the familiar rule that the 
jury is entitled to weigh the evidence in arriving at damages 
for both special and general compensation. Again, Appellant 
has no disagreement with this rule. The corollary to this 
rule is, however, that when damages are undisputed the failure 
of a jury to award such damages constitutes an inadequate verdict. 
While Respondents have conveniently placed the $204 in 
the special damage section by claiming that the jury became 
confused between general and special damages, as stated 
previously, there is no evidence except the speculation of 
Respondents that the jury intended the $204 to be special 
rather than general damages. Since in the first verdict the 
-9-
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jury found zer9 general damages it is more likely that the 
jury intended all $1144 to be special damages. In the 
second verdict, however, when it placed the $204 in the general 
damage section the jury obviously intended this amount of money 
to be included as general damages. Thus, if the $940 should have 
been included in the general damage section the result is 
simply that the $1,144 is deemed all general damages with no 
special damages. 
A review of the evidence shows that even under the light 
most favorable to the defendants, Plaintiff incurred both 
medical expenses and loss of wages due to the accident. To 
find no special damages whatsoever is clearly an error on the 
part of the jury. This Court will note that many of the medical 
bills which were incurred by Plaintiff were completely undisputed 
I 
by defendants as to their reasonableness and as to their con-
nection with the accident. The jury was therefore not free to 
find no special damages whatsoever as to this undisputed evidence. 
Finally, it should be again observed that the "47 year 
annuity at $20 a year" was a calculation arrived at entirely by 
the jury since neither side ever presented any similar type 
of evidence. This figure and calculation again points out the 
confusion on the part of the jury in making its damage award. 
For these reasons, therefore, if the verdict form is 
construed as it must be with all general damages and no special 
damages it is apparent that the damage award for specials was 
totally inadequate and would require a reversal on this point 
alone. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL. COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DT-RECT 
LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANT SINCE THERE WAS 
NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW A FACTUAL QUESTION OF 
LIABILITY FOR THE JURY. 
Respondents take a seemingly contradictory position in 
their brief. (Respondents' brief, p. 31-33). On the one 
hand they assert that since the jury found in favor of 
Plaintiffs and against Defendants as to liability that no 
error occurred by the failure of the court to direct liability 
against Defendants. On the other hand, however, they claim 
that this case should not be submitted back to the lower court 
as to damages only since the new jury "would not have all of 
the evidence before them and be able to see all the weaknesses 
of the plaintiff's position." 
Thus, Respondents admit that the question of liability 
and the evidence adduced at trial concerning liability can 
directly or indirectly affect an award of damages. 
If a plaintiff becomes confused as to the dates or events 
leading to a sequence of an automobile accident and therefore 
makes a poor witness on his or her own behalf as to the liability 
portion of a trial it is probable that a jury would conclude 
that the witness's testimony concerning damages is equally 
implausible. In effect, then, when a plaintiff is entitled 
to a directed verdict as a matter of law the failure to direct 
such a verdict places the plaintiff in jeopardy of not only having 
the jury erroneously decide liability but also having the damage 
portion of the verdict affected. 
In the instant case there is no better example of when a 
directed verdict should be granted than where a passenger is the 
-11-
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plaintiff and is suing another driver. Why the trial court 
failed to direct a verdict on behalf of Plaintiff remains 
a mystery. However, the testimony of Plaintiff relating to 
liability and her fuzzy memory concerning distances, time, 
and events could have affected the jury's determination as 
to her credibility concerning her damages. 
It cannot be said with any degree of certainty that the 
liability portion of this trial did not affect the damage portion 
by, as Respondents as stated, allowing the jury to see "all 
the weaknesses of the plaintiff's position." As such it was 
prejudicial error to require liability testimony in such a 
clearcut case mandating a directed verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury verdict form in this case is unique. Whereas 
most incorrect forms contain one error the instant case con-
tained three initial errors. While the lower court corrected 
one it failed to correct the other two and the verdict form 
as finally entered by the trial court contains a glaring error 
showing that the jury misconstrued the court's instructions 
as to special and general damages. 
Since Plaintiff's counsel only heard that portion of the 
verdict read which is not inconsistent on its face and since 
the court did not allow Plaintiff's counsel any opportunity 
to examine the verdict form before excusing the jury, it 
cannot be said that plaintiff waived the objection to such form. 
On the contrary, this case illustrates the need to formulate 
a rule allowing counsel the "opportunity" to examine a verdict 
so that a waiver can either be properly asserted or so that 
-12-
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counsel can correct an error before the jury is excused. 
Since it must be assumed that the jury awarded all 
general damages and no special damages the failure to find such 
special damages is clearly inadequate since the undisputed 
evidence showed that Plaintiff incurred both medical expenses 
and lost wages as a direct result of this accident. 
Finally, the failure to direct a verdict on behalf of 
plaintiff was not harmless error in that the liability 
portion of the trial could easily have affected the damage 
award given to Plaintiff. 
For these reasons, therefore, this case should be remanded 
for new trial as to damages only. 
MAX D. WHEELER, ESQ. 
and 
CRAIG S. COOK, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing 
brief were mailed to Phil Fishler, attorney for Defendants-
Respondents, 604 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
~~ day of June, 1981. 
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